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Introduction
In the years immediately following the uprisings of 
2010–2011, Islamist movements seemed to be the winners 
of the transformation processes in the Middle East and 
North Africa. Increasingly, they managed to translate 
their popular standing into sweeping electoral successes. 
With the demise of the authoritarian rulers in Egypt and 
Tunisia, Islamists gained more freedom, allowing them 
to widen their scope of operation and to form political 
parties, becoming official actors in both countries’ politi-
cal landscapes. With their extremely successful perfor-
mance in the first rounds of elections, Islamists became 
a focal point of attention. It seemed that, in the short and 
long-term, they would be forces to be reckoned with in 
Egyptian and Tunisian politics and society.
This reality was the motivation to use the seventeenth 
DGAP New Faces Conference to scrutinize and under-
stand Islamist beliefs, goals, agendas, and actions. A par-
ticular focus was the extent to which the new pluralistic 
system and the shift from being in the opposition to being 
a governing party have resulted in changes in ideologi-
cal stances or in the concretization of standpoints and 
principles. Islamists have evolved over the past decades, 
but always under authoritarian or semi-authoritarian 
systems. The unprecedented political openings have lent 
their evolutionary path new dynamics.
Certainty about the direction of Islamist movements 
and the genuineness of their espousal of liberal values 
and democratic principles can only be obtained if they 
are active in government and engaged in policy-making 
for a longer period of time. Hence the findings of the 
conference must be considered a snapshot of the situation 
in 2011–2012, which nevertheless offers insights into the 
causes and backgrounds of current developments.
The three-day conference aimed to investigate Islamist 
movements in Egypt and Tunisia in an interdisciplinary 
setting, to analyze the ways in which pluralism and politi-
cal openings are affecting and changing these movements, 
and to pinpoint concrete policy measures and priorities. 
The implications of these developments for the demo-
cratic process and for stability in the two countries were 
also addressed.
This report summarizes a considerable portion of par-
ticipants’ contributions as well as discussions during the 
plenary sessions and working groups. The main points 
raised are clustered around the three thematic blocs of 
the conference: ideology, state-building and domestic 
policy, and the international context.
Main Findings of the Conference
 . Islamists in Tunisia and Egypt broadly agree that the 
nation-state and democracy are politically legitimate 
systems, yet Islamism as a political project is, by defini-
tion, not liberal.
 . Most Islamist groups seek to affect political change 
without violence; they are not jihadists. Unlike 
 Al  Qaeda, many domestic jihadist groups in Egypt de-
nounced violence as a path to their political goals and 
formed political parties.
 . Secularism is largely rejected by Islamists, including 
the Ennahda Party and the Muslim Brotherhood. Liber-
als and other non-Islamist groups in Egypt and Tunisia 
call for a civil state rather than a secular state.
 . Islamists in Tunisia and Egypt generally embrace eco-
nomic liberalism. They do not call for overturning the 
class system, but for “distributive justice” to reduce the 
severity with which socio-economic disparities impact 
the poor.
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 . Islamists believe that men and women should enjoy rel-
atively equal political rights and duties. Many, however, 
favor some limits on women’s political roles, especially 
their right to be president. 
 . Women have a slightly greater public role in Ennahda 
than in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Yet neither 
party includes significant numbers of women in the 
party leadership.
 . Islamists recognize non-Muslims as fellow citizens and, 
to a large extent, are tolerant of their freedom to prac-
tice their religion. Yet, as with women, many Islamists 
seek to restrict their right to become president.
 . The behavior of Islamists in Tunisia and Egypt can best 
be characterized as pragmatic decision-making, rather 
than a systematic and single-minded effort to build 
Islamic theocracies. While these political forces have 
only just begun their tenure, there are signs that they 
may seek to adopt the authoritarian structures of their 
predecessors to sustain their newfound power.
 . During and after the uprisings, the Muslim Brother-
hood as well as Ennahda have been using new and 
traditional media to suit their purposes. There was con-
sensus that the media is one arena in which the newly 
elected Islamist parties may be adopting the repressive 
behavior of their predecessors. 
 . Today, the Sinai Peninsula, a strategically important 
area, is increasing unstable and lawless. Marginaliza-
tion of the populace, migration of jihadists to the area, 
and a rise in weapons trafficking are among the prin-
ciple causes of this volatile situation.
 . The Islamist governments in Egypt and Tunisia have 
not made any major modifications to the foreign poli-
cies of the authoritarian governments they replaced. For 
the time being, Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood 
appear willing to work with an international commu-
nity that has long been suspicious of Islamists. 
 . The EU and its member states are seeking to promote 
democracy by providing financial support, as well as 
administrative and political advice, to politicians and 
activists in the new democratic structures of Egypt and 
Tunisia. The European donors, however, are being out-
spent by the wealthy Gulf countries, especially Saudi 
Arabia.
 . The EU has stepped up its economic aid. Its response to 
the Arab Spring included the ‘three Ms’ – money, mar-
kets and mobility – the SPRING program, and direct 
funding for poorer regions in Tunisia. Economic aid has 
been complemented by programs to train new parlia-
mentarians and engage with civil society activists. Ger-
many, in addition to its contributions as an EU member 
state, is providing direct aid to Tunisia and Egypt. 
 . Egyptians and Tunisians should be wary of the Turkish 
model. When the AKP was elected, the opposition 
focused on protecting secularism from encroaching 
Islamism. This debate, however, focused on a false 
dichotomy and obscured the greater challenge to the 
state of genuine democratization. The AKP maintains 
the parameters of the state and hold on to decade-old 
policies because it considers that the best way to remain 
in power.
 . Some liberals in Egypt and Tunisia, as well as much of 
the international community, fear that these countries 
will follow the Iranian or Algerian model, that the 
democratic experiment will fail and instability and ex-
tremism will dominate the political sphere. Egyptian Is-
lamist and non-Islamist revolutionaries insist that their 
revolution is not an Islamic revolution and that they do 
not want to impose Khomeini’s model of velayat-e faqih – 
rule of the Islamic jurist.
 . International relations, however, are not limited to 
relations between Arab countries and between Arab 
countries and Western democracies. It is also necessary 
to look beyond these relationships as diversification of 
relations is very likely and can be considered part of an 
emancipation action from the West. This in turn will 
have serious implications for the role and influence of 
the West in the region.
Ideology
The Ennahda Party in Tunisia and the Freedom and Jus-
tice Party (FJP) in Egypt ( the political arm of the Muslim 
Brotherhood) won major victories in the relatively free 
and fair elections that followed the momentous events in 
these countries. These two mainstream movements com-
prise a large portion of the Islamist trend in their respec-
tive countries, yet they are not the totality of this trend.
Neither before nor after Mohammad Bouazizi sparked 
the region-wide uprising should Islamism be understood 
as a coherent, unified or monolithic movement. Instead, 
it can be understood better as a broad range of – often 
conflicting – political ideologies. The victories of Islamist 
candidates in Egypt and Tunisia’s post-revolutionary par-
liamentary and presidential elections laid bare a series of 
tensions that had remained hidden under authoritarian 
rule. For one, Islamist candidates faced unexpected chal-
lenges from the right in the form of non-violent but fun-
damentalist Salafi groups that had spent decades laboring 
in the social and cultural arena and were latecomers to 
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politics. Once in power, Islamists were forced to deal with 
an awakened domestic opposition, including these Salafi 
groups as well as their violent counterparts, Salafi jihadis, 
in places such as the Sinai Peninsula. 
The Salafi movement was not indigenous, but rather 
took root across the region during the 1970s and 1980s, 
as money from the Gulf began to enter other Arab states. 
With this financial influence, migration and commercial 
links to the Gulf increased. In Egypt, conference partici-
pants noted, Anwar Sadat encouraged the growth of the 
Salafi movement as both a counterweight to the politi-
cally ambitious Muslim Brotherhood as well as to leftist 
movements. While currently the Salafi in Egypt and Tu-
nisia resemble a loose network of sheikhs and preachers 
more than a Brotherhood-style organized movement, the 
group was able to mobilize quickly after the revolutions. 
In Egypt, the group soon emerged as the second largest 
bloc in parliament.
The Salafi movement took shape as a rival to the 
Brotherhood, although the extent of the rivalry remained 
unclear. Speakers noted the existence of a strong intellec-
tual Salafi trend inside the Brotherhood. More tangibly, in 
Egypt’s spring 2012 referendum and in Tunisia’s first post-
Ben Ali parliamentary elections, Brotherhood and Salafi 
politicians found themselves on the same side. However, 
in other instances the groups clearly disagreed, such as 
when Hamas violently cracked down on a Salafi move-
ment that emerged to challenge them, or when Egyptian 
President Mohamed Morsi ordered the military to mobi-
lize against Salafi jihadi groups in the Sinai. This antago-
nism is also manifest in Egypt’s and Tunisia’s respective 
constitution-drafting processes, where Salafi parties push 
for stricter interpretations of sharia than their Brother-
hood counterparts. 
This intra-Islamist competition is reverberating inside 
the Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda. In Egypt, the 
Brotherhood had long been able to occupy a privileged 
position because it was seen as the sole moral and 
religious alternative to the authoritarian regime, and 
because members suffered tremendously under state re-
pression. Participants also concurred that the repression 
helped the Brotherhood preserve organizational cohe-
sion, uniting disparate Azhari, traditional, Salafi, and 
Qutbi strains of thought under one leadership. Without 
the repression, and in the face of the politicization of the 
Salafi movement, the Brotherhood both lost its internal 
cohesion and its external distinctiveness among Egyp-
tian political actors. These debates have forced Islamist 
groups to clarify their positions, at the risk of fomenting 
internal conflict among different schools of thought.
1. The Nation-State and Democracy
Once, many Islamists rejected nation-states. They felt 
these institutions were Western inventions imposed on 
the Muslim world and other places as part of the colonial 
project. Such individuals privileged the Muslim umma, 
the community or nation of Muslims, above that of ethno-
linguistic national units first imagined by the Europeans.
Islamists also rejected democracy on these grounds, 
arguing that such a system of government bred hizbiyya 
(partisanship). Institutions that led to the segmentation 
of the Muslim community were by definition illegitimate. 
In the 1930s, this view permeated not just Islamist groups 
in the region; most political actors were concerned about 
partisanship in their communities.
Today, however, most Islamists accept the modern 
nation-state as the political framework. Indeed, many 
scholars consider Islamism a form of nationalism. Further, 
political actors from across the spectrum have set aside 
their concern about the relationship between hizbiyya 
and democracy. In the 1990s, Ennahda, for example, pub-
lished a treatise explaining the complementary nature 
of Islam and democracy. Following the fall of President 
Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Salafi groups that had before 
spurned the political realm and formerly violent groups 
such as al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Group) and 
Islamic Jihad formed political parties and competed in 
the 2011 parliamentary elections.
One of the most-discussed developments concerned 
the specific consequences that dealing with state struc-
tures after finding themselves in governing positions 
has had on the Islamists’ internal structures and on their 
thinking. During the course of the conference, consensus 
emerged that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was 
fundamentally unprepared to confront the reality of the 
existing state structure. Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak’s 
repression of the movement had forced the Brotherhood 
to deal concretely with circumstances, relegating abstract 
but necessary theorizing about the relation of the Brother-
hood to the modern Leviathan state to the sidelines. Thus 
when the Egyptian Brotherhood assumed control in 2011 
and 2012, they were unsure of their role in and relation to 
the state.
This inability to understand their role had profound 
organizational consequences. While a section of the Egyp-
tian society has been concerned about the “Ikhwaniza-
tion” of the Egyptian state, the Brotherhood has been 
preoccupied with compromising too much of it traditional 
mission for the sake of political affairs. Through its invest-
ment in the achievement of political power, the group 
has endangered its more basic and fundamental goal of 
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transforming society through charitable work, prosely-
tization (da’wah), and education and culture (tarbiyya). 
Goals of societal reform have been seconded to political 
necessities. For instance, under Mubarak, the Muslim 
Brotherhood had been at the forefront of protests against 
Israeli attacks on Gaza and was supportive of strikes by 
professional syndicates (unions). In power, the Brother-
hood refrained from protesting attacks on Gaza and stood 
in opposition to the doctors’ strike. 
When it came to the degree and inevitability of politi-
cal engagement of the Egyptian Brotherhood, however, 
participants had different perspectives. According to 
some, this problem was situated at a distant horizon, per-
haps when the movement suffered electoral defeat. In this 
view, the movement must take immediate steps to ensure 
that politics and da’wah remain separate so that a politi-
cal defeat would not affect other areas of activity. Others, 
however, argued that the Brotherhood had been proceed-
ing down the path of political engagement for decades, 
and had become so invested in the political process that 
the mission of da’wah had already withered away. Some 
participants forecast a similar path for the Egyptian Salafi 
movement based on their decision to participate in the 
electoral process.
When it came to examples from other countries, how-
ever, participant presented different findings. While the 
AK party in Turkey was identified by some as a case study 
in the “irresistibility” of power, in the Palestinian ter-
ritories, Hamas was taking steps to counteract their own 
political role. Hamas’ transition from a social to a political 
movement in 1987, and its emergence as a serious political 
player in the mid- to late-2000s, has caused stresses and 
fractures in the movement. In order to counteract a gen-
eral demobilization of members when Hamas entered the 
state structure, the movement has encouraged the strict 
separation of da’wah from political work, and members 
are prevented from holding positions in both. The specter 
of Fatah, which began as a revolutionary movement and 
ended as a status quo political party, looms large. In 
Tunisia, however, it appears that no discussion of the rela-
tionship between movement, party, and government has 
emerged. Perhaps this is due to the long-term weakness of 
the Islamist movement under Ben Ali.
2. Non-Violence and Jihad
One point underlined at the conference was that Osama 
bin Laden and Al Qaeda are not broadly representative 
of Islamist actors, despite the power of images of 9/11 
and other large-scale media events. The violent subset of 
Islamism is known as Jihadism. It can be defined as the 
belief that armed action is sometimes the most effective 
and most legitimate way to affect political change. Jihad-
ism, like all Islamist ideologies, is based on particular 
understandings and interpretations of Islamic texts. Some 
of the writings of Said Qutb, an Egyptian and member 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, are key texts for many of 
these groups. The Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) 
in Egypt, one group influenced by his thinking, has 
produced its own literature denouncing democracy and 
espousing violence.
Even before the events of 2011, many former jihadist 
groups had denounced violence. This change took place 
in the early 2000s, partially as a result of pressure from 
autocrats afraid of American interventionism. These post-
jihadist groups justified their renunciation of violence 
by citing historical narratives in which Muslims com-
promised, peacefully, with rulers to advance the good 
of the umma. Yet, this renunciation of violence is still 
many steps away from an acceptance of liberal democ-
racy. Many post-jihadist groups continue to oppose the 
regimes in their countries, albeit through non-violent 
forms of resistance. Most members remain proud of their 
former efforts at violent resistance. In the wake of the so-
called Arab Spring, one participant believed, post-jihadist 
groups in Egypt sought to distinguish themselves from 
the Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood through their 
strong opposition to liberalism.
3. Secularism and Liberalism
Tunisians and Egyptians continue to debate the extent to 
which secularism and liberalism are appropriate in their 
societies as they reshape their countries’ political systems. 
Liberals and leftists, as well as secular conservatives, find 
themselves at odds with Islamists on the role religion 
should play in politics and society. This debate plays out 
in discussions on many topics, including the equality of 
women and the rights of religious minorities.
Secularism
Secularism is largely rejected by Islamists. In Egypt, the 
Muslim Brotherhood stands firmly against the idea of a 
secular state. In Tunisia – a state once modelled on France 
and Kemalist Turkey and widely-recognized as the most 
secular in the Arab world – Ennahda’s position on secular-
ism is more opaque. The party’s 74-page party platform, 
published in 2011, notes that Islam is part of the country’s 
“cultural heritage,” but does not include the word “sharia” 
at all.
The generally negative connotation of the term “secu-
larism,” according to one explanation, has led liberals and 
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other non-Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia to coin a new 
term, al-dawla al-mediniyya (the civil state). In Egypt, for 
example, liberal members of the constitutional assembly 
are pushing for the new Egyptian state to be defined as 
a civil state, while many Islamists want the new con-
stitution to specify the Islamic nature of the Egyptian 
government. Participants raised the point that some 
non-Islamists, however, are concerned that by replacing 
secularism with the idea of a civil state, they are conced-
ing ideological as well as rhetorical ground in the debate 
over the nature of the state, and the civil rights and liber-
ties that will be protected in the future.
Economic Liberalism
The main Islamist parties in Tunisia and Egypt – Ennahda 
and the Freedom and Justice party – generally embrace 
economic liberalism while largely rejecting social lib-
eralism. Many Islamists believe the implementation of 
“distributive justice” is the appropriate response to socio-
economic disparity. Although few people in these coun-
tries are calling for the dismantling of the class system, 
Islamism is not inherently opposed to socialist ideology. 
Said Qutb advocated Islamic socialism in the 1960s, and 
there are trends in Iranian and Turkish Islamism which 
support socialist policies today. 
Islamist support for social liberalism is more fraught. 
Today, dominant ideologies in Islamism present particu-
lar problems for the equality of women and non-Muslims 
in the social and political spheres. Other minorities and 
protected classes, for example ethnic minorities, are less 
central to these debates.
Women
The position of Islamists with respect to women has 
become increasingly liberal over the past thirty years. 
Now most groups, including Ennahda and the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood, think men and women should enjoy 
relatively equal political rights and duties. In a democrat-
ic political context, Islamists support the right of women 
to vote and most support the right of women to hold 
political office. A participant explained that there are 
still a few on the fringes who oppose the idea of women 
exercising wilaya (legal power) over men. This category 
of Islamists thus denies the right of women to hold any 
political position. 
Women have a slightly greater public role in Ennahda 
than in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, yet neither 
party includes significant numbers of women in their 
leadership. Moreover, Ennahda sought to reverse some 
aspects of family law and other policies regarding women, 
such as the prohibition of polygamy and the right to abor-
tion that had previously made Tunisia one of the most 
progressive states in the region. 
Freedom of Religion
The position of Islamists with respect to freedom of 
religious practice might best be described as minimally 
tolerant rather than liberal. There was consensus in 
this regard. In previous eras, a few Muslim thinkers 
had advocated a broader understanding of tolerance, in 
which other religions and other prophets could be seen as 
equally valid. They doubted whether human beings could 
know or attain truth, and thus accepted the premise that 
others from different religious traditions might also come 
close to the truth.
Today, most Islamists recognize that there are dif-
ferences in religion and religiosity. Most Islamists in 
Egypt and Tunisia are willing to tolerate a certain level 
of plurality and recognize non-Muslims and non-Sunni 
Muslims as fellow citizens. The language surrounding re-
ligious plurality, however, is itself religious. The discourse 
refers to binaries of good versus evil and references fiqh 
(Islamic jurisprudence). Many Islamists in Tunisia and 
Egypt want to restrict the political rights of Christian and 
Jewish minorities, particularly their right to become pres-
ident. Additionally, few feel it is legitimate for a Muslim to 
become an agnostic or convert to a different religion.
Islamism in Practice
Prior to the so-called Arab Spring, many Middle Eastern 
autocrats justified their continued rule as the only bulwark 
against the rise of Islamists to power. Such arguments 
were made to pacify non-Islamist domestic opposition as 
well as international benefactors. The mantra “one man, 
one vote, one time” suggested that the introduction of de-
mocracy in the Arab world would result in the election of 
Islamists who would subsequently establish theocratic au-
thoritarian regimes. These imagined theocracies would, it 
was feared, suppress women and religious minorities. Ad-
ditionally, the states might become refuges for and finan-
ciers of Islamist terror networks. However, the behavior 
of Islamists in Tunisia and Egypt since the fall of Ben Ali 
and Mubarak is best characterized by pragmatic political 
decision-making, rather than systematic, single-minded 
efforts to build Islamic theocracies. Several participants 
shared the view that, despite this fact, the organizations’ 
pragmatic approaches to politics do not necessarily indi-
cate a strong commitment to democratization.
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1. Pragmatism and Status Quo
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Isma’iliyya, a 
city on the Suez Canal, in 1928. During the last years of 
the Egyptian monarchy, the organization was decidedly 
anti-colonial. The Brotherhood faced periods of both 
severe repression and relative tolerance during the presi-
dencies of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni 
Mubarak. The mid-1990s, partially in response to the suc-
cess of Brotherhood candidates in the 1995 parliamentary 
elections, was a period of acute repression. Subsequently, 
the organization put more effort into da’wah (proselytiza-
tion) in an attempt to slow state repression of members. 
Some members, discontent with the Muslim Brother-
hood’s lack of political engagement, left the movement 
and founded the Wasat Party in 2000. Muslim Brother-
hood parliamentary candidates again enjoyed significant 
victories in the 2005 parliamentary election. In the wake 
of these successes, the organization was careful not to 
anger the Mubarak government in its interactions with 
domestic and international NGOs. Furthermore, the po-
litical platform they published in 2007 was rather vague.
One participant also gave an overview of the evolu-
tion of Islamism in Tunisia. The roots of the Ennahda 
party are somewhat more recent. In the 1970s, Al-Jama’a 
al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Group), a precursor to Ennahda, 
was founded in Tunisia. After President Bourguiba legal-
ized political organizations in 1981, Islamists founded an 
official political wing, the Mouvement de la Tendance 
Islamique (MTI). In 1988, one year after taking power, 
President Ben Ali banned political parties with religious 
platforms and the MTI changed its name to Harakat 
al-Nahda (the Renaissance Movement, also Ennahda), 
while maintaining its political platform. By the 1990s, the 
Tunisian government had imprisoned or exiled the move-
ment’s leaders, yet those exiled leaders continued their 
opposition to Ben Ali’s regime and published a detailed 
party platform.
After the fall of Ben Ali and Mubarak, Ennahda and 
the Muslim Brotherhood, respectively, toned down their 
language. In an effort to broaden their appeal and foster 
dialogue with liberal groups and other political parties, 
Ennahda stopped using the slogan “Islam huwa al-hal” (Is-
lam is the solution) and, instead, maintained that “Islam 
is democracy” and “Islam is human rights.” The Muslim 
Brotherhood, for their part, founded a political party, 
the Freedom and Justice Party. Once in office, President 
Mohamed Morsi promoted a number of ideas originally 
advocated by the reformist youth of the Muslim Brother-
hood in the years before the revolution.
Other groups, including Salafis and post-jihadists, took 
advantage of the newly competitive political environ-
ments in Tunisia and Egypt and established their own po-
litical parties. Salafi organizations in both countries had 
long shunned the political sphere, a stance that imparted 
their candidates with an air of integrity and credibility 
and imbued the nascent political parties with legitimacy 
in the eyes of many voters. Additionally, those groups 
which had denounced their formerly violent practices in 
the 1990s remained non-violent in the aftermath of the 
revolutions, despite the opportunities to stockpile arms, 
recruit youth, and gather information on areas sensitive 
to attack. They instead registered as political parties; the 
Islamic Group won thirteen seats and al-Jihad affiliates 
won two seats in the now disbanded Egyptian parliament.
Participants were divided on the actual political behav-
ior of the Salafis in Egypt. On the one hand, it was argued 
that they displayed a relatively high degree of political 
sophistication, especially in contrast to the Brotherhood 
at a similar stage. The Salafi decision to support former 
Brotherhood member Abdul Moneim Abu el-Fotouh as 
president was cited as evidence of this sophistication, 
showing that the Salafis recognized their own political 
inexperience. On the other hand, discussants noted that 
the Salafists’ appeal was based largely on their previous 
political detachment and “authenticity.” After abandon-
ing this to participate in elections, they would likely 
become indistinguishable from the Brotherhood. 
Status Quo Policies
One major theme that emerged from the discussions was 
the assessment that the Brotherhood in Egypt, Ennahda 
in Tunisia, and the AKP in Turkey had essentially pursued 
status-quo policies both domestically and internationally. 
This is most visible in the economic sphere. The rise of a 
business class within the Brotherhood leadership caused 
the group to become devoted to and invested in Mubarak-
era neoliberal economic policies, and members were 
unwilling to sacrifice their privileged positions to pursue 
a revolutionary ideological project. Participants pointed 
out that similar neoliberal economic doctrines gained 
adherents among Islamist groups in Tunisia and Turkey, 
and noted how this had begun to provoke a backlash from 
traditional constituencies.
Domestically, neither the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt nor Ennahda in Tunisia have been able to create 
clear policies that flow naturally from their ideologies. 
Policymaking has been ad-hoc and simplistic. Partici-
pants pointed out that the general Islamist diagnosis as to 
why the prior regimes had failed was that they had been 
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secular. Specifically with regard to Tunisia, participants 
emphasized that Ennahda advanced hurried and ill-con-
sidered solutions to economic problems, later withdraw-
ing those solutions that faced criticism. The Ennahda gov-
ernment also dismissed the governor of the central bank 
with no explanation and no clear plan for a successor. In 
Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood failed to articulate an 
economic strategy for the country, instead simply accept-
ing the existing neoliberal policies pursued by Mubarak 
and criticizing alternatives proposed by liberal groups. 
This focus on the status-quo policies of the Brother-
hood spurred further discussions about the proper termi-
nology for the events. Reviewing the continuity between 
Mubarak-era policies and those of the Morsi government, 
many participants expressed reluctance to speak of a 
“revolution.” In Tunisia, Ennahda was similarly criticized 
for merely changing the faces, and not the structure, of 
the existing regime. Others were more patient, argu-
ing that it was still too early to tell, and that unraveling 
the militaristic, centralized, and authoritarian states of 
Mubarak and Ben Ali would be a lengthy process. 
2. Media and the Internet: From Resistance to 
Censorship
There was consensus that the media is one arena in which 
the newly elected Islamist parties may be adopting the 
behavior of their predecessors. When the Islamists were 
marginalized by the authoritarian regimes in Tunisia and 
Egypt, the Internet was a tool of empowerment, because 
it enabled circumvention of state control. It was a means 
of coming together to fight a common enemy, be it Ben Ali 
or Mubarak.
In the years before the uprising, the Muslim Brother-
hood had an active online presence. The organization 
officially went online in 2005 with Ikhwanweb, a conse-
quence of the online activism of the Egyptian Movement 
for Change, popularly known as Kefaya. Over the next 
few years, a number of Muslim Brothers, many of whom 
were young reformists, began blogging and building con-
nections with their Kefaya counterparts – presenting the 
Brotherhood as a non-threatening organization composed 
of regular Egyptians.
During the uprising and in the months that followed, 
the Muslim Brotherhood sought to establish themselves 
as a legitimate source of news. They are widely consid-
ered to be the force behind the Rassd News Network 
(RNN), a Facebook site that was a crucial source of 
information during the 18 days Egyptians spent in Tahrir 
Square. RNN has since expanded its operations to a 
number of countries in the Middle East. After Mubarak 
fell, Ikhwanweb expanded its operations and bought 18 
domain names related to Ikhwanbook, a Muslim Broth-
erhood version of Facebook. Additionally, the FJP took 
advantage of the internet during the elections and had 
representatives tweet vote counts. Their tallies were 
nearly identical to official accounts. These efforts by the 
Muslim Brotherhood demonstrate their desire to shape 
the public sphere. Together with major changes in various 
offices responsible for the state media and legal cases 
against outspoken critics of President Morsi, the Muslim 
Brotherhood demonstrated their commitment to amplify 
their voice in a public sphere previously dominated by the 
Mubarak state media.
Ennahda has also expanded its online presence since 
the fall of Ben Ali. Now that they are in power, censorship 
of the internet has been lifted, although Ennahda does 
monitor content shared on the web. Additionally, Tunisia 
continues to censor printed materials and art exhibitions, 
and has repeatedly arrested journalists for criticizing a 
proposed anti-blasphemy law and similar charges.
3. Violence and Security
Both the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda in 
Tunisia have had connections to violent groups or actions 
in the past. In the interwar period, many political parties 
in Egypt, like their counterparts in Europe, had armed 
branches. The Muslim Brotherhood was no exception. 
Their secret apparatus was involved in the conflict in Pal-
estine and possibly in some politically-motivated violence 
within Egypt as well. Additionally, radicalized former 
members of the Brotherhood likely assassinated President 
Anwar Al-Sadat. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current leader of 
Al-Qaeda, was briefly a member as well. As for Ennahda, 
it is sometimes suggested that it was involved in an at-
tempted coup against Ben Ali. This suspicion may have 
precipitated the major crackdown that sent many of the 
movement’s members to jail or into exile.
Today, the Sinai Peninsula, a strategically important 
area, is increasingly unstable and lawless. The margin-
alization of the local population, the immigration of 
jihadists to the area, and the rise in arms trafficking are 
among the principle causes of this volatile situation. The 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood had long maintained its 
support for Palestine. Since Morsi’s election however, the 
Egyptian army has closed tunnels that run under the 
border between the Gaza Strip and the Sinai. The efforts 
undertaken by Morsi’s administration to curb the activi-
ties of Hamas, the Palestinian outgrowth of the Muslim 
Brotherhood founded in 1989, have been greater than any 
by the Mubarak regime.
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4. Non-Islamist Opposition
The uprisings and the emergence of Islamists as major 
players in the political process have also had ramifica-
tions for other societal actors. In Egypt, the Coptic church 
long served as an interlocutor between the regime and 
the Coptic community. This position allowed the church 
to bolster its institutional power, making it a locus of 
political and social activity inside the Coptic communi-
ty. After the so-called Arab Spring and the proliferation 
of political parties however, the church is struggling to 
maintain this control and preserve political structures 
that existed under Mubarak and his predecessors. 
In Tunisia, one problem identified by participants is 
that civil society networks are overwhelmingly focused 
on abstract philosophical debates over secularism and the 
meaning of the civil state rather than articulating specific 
policies to engage the citizenry. The problem is similar 
within opposition parties. In both Egypt and Tunisia, the 
non-Islamist opposition has yet to offer a convincing 
ideational or policy-based counterproposal to Islamism, 
instead choosing to engage Islamists where they are 
most powerful: issues of identity. If these forces want to 
succeed in contests with Islamists, there was broad agree-
ment that they must work on the levels of both ideas and 
organization.
The International Context
The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt and the changes they 
have precipitated will impact how these countries inter-
act with other nations and international organizations. 
Many believed that for the time being, Ennahda and the 
Muslim Brotherhood appeared willing to work with an 
international community that has long been suspicious 
of Islamists. Additionally, there have not yet been any 
major breaks with the foreign policies of the authoritarian 
governments these Islamist parties replaced, for example 
with respect to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict or Iran.
At the same time, the international community has 
already begun to change its relations with the new 
governments, particularly as regards financial aid. Most 
countries are offering financial and administrative sup-
port to the new governments and their citizens, and the 
European Union and its member states hope to encourage 
democracy building. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States 
are also offering large aid packages to Egypt and Tunisia.
Additionally, as the countries embark on a new project 
of state-building and endeavor to write constitutions, they 
are looking at examples from around the world. Turkey is 
perhaps the most prominent role model, in part because 
the country has now experienced ten years of rule by 
an elected Islamist party – the Justice and Development 
Party (Adelet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP). Iran, Algeria, 
Pakistan, and other countries that have experienced 
different forms of Islamist governments, are largely 
considered models to be avoided. In the case of Tunisia, 
the relevance of the French model is an important part of 
discourse on state-building.
1. Muslim Brotherhood Foreign Policy
The Muslim Brotherhood began courting Western govern-
ments years before the revolution. Their first major efforts 
began in 2005, after their success in the parliamentary 
elections. That year, the Brotherhood launched its Eng-
lish-language website (www.ikhwanweb.com) to demon-
strate that the West has nothing to fear from the Islamist 
movement. In the years that followed, the Muslim Broth-
erhood increased the scope and frequency of its commen-
tary on Egyptian foreign policy. Additionally, they sought 
to build relationships with Western NGOs; however, these 
connections were all informal and sanctioned by the 
Mubarak government so as not to antagonize the regime. 
In the post-revolutionary period, the movement contin-
ued to introduce itself to the world. President Morsi’s 
first months in office included an ambitious international 
travel schedule. Freedom and Justice Party delegates also 
traveled to many countries around the world.
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has long main-
tained its support for Palestine. The Egyptian organiza-
tion has provided financial support to Hamas since its 
founding in 1989, but never had organizational power 
over its Palestinian outgrowth. The Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood customarily referred to Israel as “the Zionist 
entity” in their Arabic-language rhetoric and publica-
tions, thus denying the legal standing of its neighbor. In 
2007, the Egyptian organization began issuing calls for a 
referendum on the Camp David Accords.
A noticeable change in the Brotherhood’s rhetoric 
emerged following the election of Mohammad Morsi as 
president. For the first time, prominent voices expressed 
support for a two-state solution; by recognizing such 
plans as legitimate, the Brotherhood tacitly recognized 
the state of Israel. The probability that such statements 
will greatly influence the opinions of rank-and-file mem-
bers is limited by the continued circulation of Brother-
hood literature that refers to Israel as a Zionist entity.
Hamas was disappointed with the decisions President 
Morsi made with respect to the Sinai Peninsula and the 
border with the Gaza Strip. Under his rule, the Egyptian 
government made a much more concerted effort to close 
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the smuggling tunnels that run under the border than 
was undertaken in the Mubarak era. Moreover, some ana-
lysts suspect that General el-Sisi, who replaced General 
Tantawi as Defense Minister and Chairman of SCAF in 
August 2012, maintains close relationship with his Israeli 
counterparts. It is thus possible that Morsi’s maneuvering 
to promote el-Sisi also strengthened the channels of com-
munication between the Egyptian and Israeli militaries.
Similarly, it is unlikely that Egypt’s relationship with 
Iran will shift greatly following the electoral success of 
candidates affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. The 
organization has expressed its desire for ‘normal’ rela-
tions with Iran, and President Morsi travelled to the coun-
try in August. Yet his visit was part of a conference and 
not an official state visit. Notably, his speech there criti-
cized Iran for its role in the continuing conflict in Syria, a 
position that is widely unpopular in Egypt and one that 
will likely slow any warming in relations between the two 
countries in the near future.
2. Western Reactions to the Changes
One survey of experts reported that following the 2011 
uprisings, Turkey, followed by the Arab League, Saudi 
Arabia, and then the European Union, are the four most 
influential countries or organizations in the Middle East. 
The EU and its member states are seeking to promote 
democracy by providing financial support, as well as ad-
ministrative and political advice, to politicians and activ-
ists in the new democratic contexts of Egypt and Tunisia. 
The European donors, however, are being outspent by the 
wealthy Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia.
The efforts of both the EU and Germany are more 
extensive in Tunisia than Egypt. This disparity is partially 
a result of Tunisia being the first country to bring down 
its former autocratic leader and the first to hold elections. 
The Egyptians, unlike the Tunisians, did not invite the 
EU to observe their elections. European involvement in 
Egypt is also more limited because of the charges brought 
against foreign NGO workers, including employees of a 
German organization in Egypt. Germany’s particular ties 
to Tunisia pre-date the so-called Arab Spring; today there 
are 280 German companies operating in Tunisia but only 
78 in Egypt.
Following the uprisings, the EU is providing economic 
aid through various initiatives. Integrating the ‘three 
Ms’ – money, markets and mobility – into the European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) is an effort to spur growth in 
the Arab economies by increasing economic linkages to 
Europe. The EU’s economic aid is complemented by the 
provision of political and technical support. The EU is 
also supporting civil society organizations and endeavor-
ing to engage with grassroots political activists. The goal 
of this program is to encourage citizens to scrutinize their 
government and hold it accountable. Finally, the more-
for-more principle of the ENP aims to make economic and 
political aid contingent on the provision of civil rights and 
liberties: as countries increase (or decrease) the freedoms 
they guarantee for their citizens, the EU will adjust its aid 
accordingly.
Germany, in addition to its contributions as an EU 
member state, is providing direct aid to Tunisia and to 
Egypt. Germany’s bilateral efforts may however be redun-
dant. Furthermore, given that many areas are in need of 
support or reform, the burden on the states applying for 
aid increases, as the number of proposals to be submitted 
increases with each area of possible engagement. Yet Ger-
many’s efforts were considered helpful to fill institutional 
and policy gaps that resulted from uneven implementa-
tion of EU policies and poor coordination both among 
European organizations and between European and other 
donor nations. Also, Germany as a leader of the EU can 
influence EU policy. When, for example, Germany accepts 
Tunisia as a partner, the EU and other member states are 
more likely to extend aid as well.
3. Examples and Models
Since the fall of Ben Ali and Mubarak, Turkey has been 
discussed as a model Tunisia and Egypt might choose to 
follow. In the interwar period, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 
founder of the Turkish state, built a secular state safe-
guarded by the military. Then, in 2002, the AKP, an 
Islamist party, came to power. Strong institutional 
checks and balances in many ways curb the powers of the 
Islamists, but because the Turkish constitution is semi-
authoritarian, the AKP has taken on a wide variety of 
powers over the past ten years. One example mentioned 
was violations of freedom of the press in the face of un-
wanted criticism. Despite their rise to power, the Turkish 
Islamists did not reform policies they had criticized prior 
to their political success. The AKP was once highly criti-
cal of preventing women from wearing headscarves on 
university campuses, yet in the past ten years they made 
no substantive changes to this policy.
Turkish participants warned their Egyptian and 
Tunisian colleagues against taking their country as a 
role model. Some participants argued that the much-
discussed conflict between secularism and religion in 
Turkey was a red herring. In reality, the Turkish state 
privileges Sunni Hanafi Islam and takes an active role in 
its propagation and management. Any attempt to apply 
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Turkey’s lessons must, according to discussants, reflect on 
this reality. Similarly, Turkish politics are not centered on 
the secular-religious conflict, but are multipolar, compris-
ing myriad groups who align and re-align around multiple 
conflict points.
For opponents of Islamist parties, Turkey also offers 
an instructive case. A number of civil society actors have 
emerged there, often from the Islamists’ own constituen-
cies, to press demands against the government. These 
groups cannot be captured in the traditional secular-
Islamist vocabulary, but instead coalesce around issues of 
women’s rights, transparency, foreign policy, and lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, and transgender rights, among others.
The Turkish case also reveals the role of the West in 
shaping the discourse concerning Islamist parties. Tur-
key became the poster child for “moderate Islam” in the 
American foreign policy establishment after 2001, based on 
its support for the invasion of Afghanistan and its staunch 
membership in NATO. Although Turkey and the U.S. fell 
out over Turkish refusal to participate in the U.S.-led inva-
sion of Iraq as well as Turkish policies of accommodation 
towards Iran and Syria, Turkey’s role in the Arab uprising 
has reestablished its image in the eyes of the West. These 
shifting positions, however, reveal a key truth, one par-
ticipant argued: the trumpeting of the Turkish model for 
Arab countries has essentially become code for hegemonic 
actors seeking to reinforce existing balances of power and 
economic arrangements. As the prior discussions had made 
clear, Islamist groups in Egypt and Tunisia have seemingly 
acceded to these conditions.
Other Countries
Post-“Arab Spring” discourse presents Iran, Algeria, and 
Pakistan as the Islamist state models to be avoided. Liberals 
in Egypt and Tunisia, as well as much of the international 
community, fear that these countries will follow the Irani-
an or Algerian model, that the democratic experiment will 
fail and instead instability and extremism will dominate 
the political sphere. Egyptian Islamists and non-Islamist 
revolutionaries insist that their revolution is not an Islamic 
revolution and that they do not want to impose Khomeini’s 
model of velayat-e faqih – the rule of the Islamic jurist. The 
Pakistani model is raised as a warning by those focused 
on transnational security issues. Officially, Pakistan works 
to arrest and expel Taliban members in their territory, yet 
unofficially there are ties between the government and the 
organization. The unrest in the Sinai Peninsula is giving 
rise to fears that a similar scenario could emerge in Egypt.
Thanks to its colonial history, the French model of laïcité 
has long played a role in Tunisian political development. 
Now many Tunisians are asking whether France is really 
the most appropriate model for their new constitution. This 
discussion is particularly strong with respect to the debate 
over the inclusion of secularism in the new constitution. 
The French constitution includes a very strict interpretation 
of secularism. There was agreement that the constitutions 
of many other well-functioning democracies, including 
Ireland, Greece, and the United States, offer alternative ap-
proaches to the relationship between religion and the state 
that may prove to be valuable alternatives.
Note
  The conference was held under the Chatham House Rule.
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